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1. Principles of Funding Mechanisms 
In the past decade, education policy has undergone a paradigm change in many countries: state 
government and control has been replaced by supervision. The educational institutions have been 
granted a larger degree of autonomy combined with lump-sum budgets, contract management 
and target-oriented funding. Responsible for this change were new trends in public management 
based on institutional economics and theories of social choice.1  
Within this context, the paper of Rosalind Levačić gives a detailed insight into different funding 
methods for budgeting schools in seven European countries (the Netherlands, England, Finland, 
Sweden, Poland, Russia, and Iceland), describing “some key issues in designing and operating 
formula funding” and comparing “the relative advantages of funding schools by formula” to the 
traditional administrative discretion approach. While the traditional approach should lead to an 
inefficient allocation of resources, the formula funding is assumed to lead to a more transparent 
allocation of resources and to allow gains in efficiency. 
With respect to formula funding, a number of variables – characterising a specific educational 
institution - are taken into account. This could be the number of pupils in different grades, pov-
erty and learning, the need for indicators or the location of schools, for instance. To obtain a bet-
ter general view of the different mathematical formula funding systems, Levačić suggests a clas-
sification scheme involving the following components: basic allocation (component 1), curricu-
lum enhancement (component 2), pupil-specific factors (component 3) and school-specific fac-
tors (component 4), whereby the issue of appropriate indicators for the pupil-specific factors is 
the most difficult one. 
In England, for instance, there is a strong emphasis on component 1. Components 3 and 4 are 
also utilised whereby component 2 is not featured at all. Generally speaking, the English formula 
system seems to be the most comprehensive one. In the Swedish example, component 1 domi-
nates the formula, component 3 is not considered and component 4 is only considered indirectly. 
The funding system acts as a “quasi” voucher for schools. 
With respect to mathematical formula funding, three areas of controversy are raised by Levačić: 
namely, the issue of how to determine the costs of a school (including salary, infrastructure and 
teaching materials), the issue of non-manipulable indicators and the debate concerning funding 
input versus performance. Finally, the incentives and impacts of the different funding methods 
are discussed in brief but not empirically validated. 
Even though a number of different points could be raised for discussion, I shall concentrate on 
the following ones: 
- does formula funding really enhance efficiency as proposed in the paper? 
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- is formula funding suitable for political governance? Does it help to reach political objec-
tives and 
- what are the advantages and disadvantages of formula based funding? 
Finally, I would like to present very briefly a new funding mechanism for educational institu-
tions on the tertiary level based on standard cost accounting.  
 
 
2. Does formula-based funding enhance efficiency 
Definition: Efficiency is a performance indicator and defined as an output / input relation. In the 
education system, student numbers, infrastructure and teacher salaries are often used as input 
factors. For output you can either use factors directly resulting from the education production 
process such as the number of diplomas or retention rates, or, you can base it on the outcome. 
The outcome of the education process is the quality of education. To calculate the efficiency of a 
system, there are two possibilities: you can calculate either the output efficiency or the outcome 
efficiency.  
Output efficiency: concerning Levačić, formula funding appears to provide more efficiency than 
other funding methods based on the assumption that the allocation of resources by a lump-sum 
budget generates more efficiency due to increased financial flexibility. This efficiency gain 
should be due primarily to the notion that an organisation is better motivated and able to regulate 
its internal matters than a distant ministry. Unfortunately we do not have any data from the 
schools analysed in the seven European countries to test this hypothesis. To cope with this diffi-
culty and to give the reader an idea whether efficiency gains are possible in the educational sys-
tem, we quote a study from the university sector, in which the output efficiency of the Swiss uni-
versities was analysed for the years from 2000-2003.2 As the Swiss universities have enjoyed 
more autonomy since the late 1990s, it should be possible to make gains in efficiency visible 
over the course of time. 
The method used to analyse efficiency behaviour was a DEA method, which calculates effi-
ciency based on an optimisation process. As the DEA method allocates optimum weights to all 
input und output factors, the maximum weights is attached to those factors in which a university 
performs better in comparison with others. The DEA methods are benevolent due to optimisation 
of weightings and the fact that decision units are always compared to decision units with similar 
objectives and preferences.  
The question as to whether autonomy for the Swiss universities has paid off could not be finally 
cleared. Taken on a whole, the behaviour of the universities was too heterogeneous and the re-
sults were not significant: only 40% of the universities showed small increases in efficiency, 
30% of the universities reduced their efficiency and 30% showed no change in efficiency behav-
iour.3 With respect to these heterogeneous results, it is assumed that an increase in autonomy 
does not lead per se to an increase in efficiency. In order to achieve gains in efficiency, not only 
autonomy but also internal organisational reforms, which affect both processes and structures, 
are demanded and last but not least a change in university culture is necessary. In reality, all uni-
versities, which were able to increase their efficiency, have been confronted with major changes 
and restructuring-processes. 
Due to the fact that only universities were analysed, it would be of interest to find out whether 
the results are homogenous for the whole educational system (primary, secondary and tertiary 
level) or if there are any differences. 
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Outcome-efficiency:  A study which analyses outcome efficiency for schools is the Wössmann 
study. Wössmann analysed education quality by means of cognitive performance tests and dis-
cussed the input-outcome relation.4 The empirical results clearly show that5 neither financial 
autonomy nor more resources have led to better education quality.6 In contrast to the frequently 
used political argument that more resources and more autonomy automatically lead to better out-
comes, other factors have been identified to enhance school performance in a sustainable and 
significant manner such as: 
- competition within educational institutions (private and public sector) 
- autonomy, but coupled with centralised examinations. Based on the results of the TIMSS 
and TIMSS-Repeat study, Grundlach and Wössmann found a positive central examina-
tion effect of approximately one year to be effective.7 
- a high number of private schools coupled with a high level of public funding. 
Saving (efficiency) incentives: It is often assumed that traditional funding results in perverse in-
centives as less spending regularly results in a lower budget in the next year and therefore all the 
available resources are spent to keep the budget at the same level. But, this could also be true for 
formula-funded units. If formula-funded units save money and are not allowed to retain their 
savings, they will also spend their whole budget. Incentives for saving money are only given if 
savings can be retained and reserves built up independently if the units are historic or formula-
based funded. However, in the public sector it is difficult to build up reserves and the reason why 
is obvious: building up reserves with taxpayers’ money is politically a very delicate matter.   
 
3. Is formula funding suitable for political governance (vertical equity)?  
As formula-based funding is a policy instrument, it should give incentive to schools to develop in 
a certain manner, which is determined by politics. For the measurement of the impact of the in-
centives, effectiveness could be analysed by measuring the achievement of a target. Unfortu-
nately, we know very little about targets and the achievement of targets in the seven European 
countries described in the Levačić paper.  
Even though we do not have data from the schools analysed, concerning the seven European 
countries I should like to discuss very briefly some results we obtained from an effectiveness 
analysis of the Swiss university funding system. To calculate the governance impact of the for-
mula-based funding, the central state subsidies were examined for the period from 2000-2003. 8 
In order to determine the behaviour of the universities, the relative changes in the individual uni-
versities were identified by analysing the most important indicators, derived from the main tar-
gets of the University Funding Law such as: 
 1st target: reducing study times 
 indicator: number of students in the norm study time 
 2nd target: increasing the number of foreign students 
 indicator: number of foreign students 
 3rd target: intensifying research activities 
 indicator: research months per professor granted by state research promo-
tion institutions 
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 4th target: increasing the acquisition of private funds 
indicator: private funds acquired in CHF 
Based on the results of the years 2000-2003, the impact was found to be rather weak. Whether 
formula-based funding by the central state can really prove to be effective, could not be judged 
conclusively.9 Of particular note is that payment according to norm study times has not brought 
any positive change in the sense of reducing study times although both the central states and the 
member states use the same type of incentive system. One reason for the failure could be that the 
universities have been hesitant to introduce the necessary regulations - for example, significantly 
higher study fees for long-term students - to support this target. 
Based on these results, it has to be assumed that formula-based funding, especially in subsidiary 
allocation systems, is not a very powerful instrument for political governance. This is especially 
true for a funding system involving several objectives. The results from this study are in line 
with the results of Burke & Minassians, who also found only a moderate impact resulting from 
formula-based funding and contract management.10 
  
4. The Advantages and Disadvantages of formula-based Funding 
Horizontal equity: One of the most important advantages of formula-based funding is the trans-
parency and equity with which it is associated. It is true that, using formula-based funding, all 
institutions are treated equally and there is no negotiation advantage of more or less skilled prin-
ciples. But one of the remaining problems is the problem of fairness. If the formula is not com-
prehensive and does not involve a satisfying number of a school’s characteristics, formula fund-
ing becomes unfair. On the other hand, if the formula considers too many parameters, it would 
be difficult to explain it to Parliament and the sensitivity of the system will be low (inert system). 
This reduces the impact given by this type of funding. 
Vertical equity: Vertical equity means that schools will receive a higher price for students with 
defined special needs. This should compensate schools for additional costs and encourage them 
to accept students with special needs. Even though vertical equity is assumed to be important in 
many of the countries analysed, we do not know if vertical equity has been paid off by the for-
mula funding system. As already mentioned before, the results from the Swiss university system 
show a rather weak impact. 
Fairness: very little is known about the fairness perceived by the schools with respect to for-
mula-based funding. It would be very interesting to know how schools have reacted and how 
much time they needed to adjust from traditional funding to formula-based funding. 
Side effects of formula funding (perverse incentives): Even though there is large number of dif-
ferent funding practices, we do not know which ones induce positive and which ones induce per-
verse effects. Nor do we know how schools have developed after the formula-based funding sys-
tem was introduced. The positive and negative effects of different funding incentives in a given 
context would be a topic of interest to make sure that the educational institutions learn from each 
other and develop in a favourable way. 
Performance-based funding versus input-oriented funding: performance-based funding has been 
one element, which was introduced with paradigm change in the public management systems. 
Performance-based funding involves contract management, lump sum budgets and output-
oriented funding. In very rare cases, outcome is funded but, due to the complexity of the social 
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systems, outcome is difficult to determine and can be influenced by many factors beyond of the 
control of a certain public institution. 
The examples in Rosalind Levačić’s paper are all more or less based on an input-oriented fund-
ing system. It is surprising that, on the primary school level, performance-based funding has not 
really entered the system compared with university funding, where contract management and 
output-oriented funding (including target-oriented funding) becomes more and more important 
(see table 1). Even though there is a basic budget nearly everywhere, which is input-oriented 
funded, contract management and output-oriented funding are used widely. 
 
  
Table 1: Funding Systems of Universities11 
Country Basic budget: input-
based, number of stu-
dents (different weights) 
Contract man-
agement 
Output-oriented 
England Yes Yes - 
Austria Yes Yes Yes 
Baden-Württemberg Yes Yes Yes 
Bavaria Yes No Yes: small part 
1.5% of the whole 
budget 
USA : Tennessee Yes No Yes: small part - 
2%-6% of the 
whole budget 
Australia Yes Yes: very rudi-
mentary  
Yes: but only for 
research 
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes: 37% of the 
whole budget 
 
 
 
 
Denmark No No Yes: taxameter 
system, weighted 
with respect to 
different study 
domains 
 
France Yes Yes: 1/3 of the 
budget  
No 
 
5. New Aspects of Formula-based Funding in Swiss Universities: Standard Cost 
Accounting 
University funding – at least in Switzerland – is slightly different from the funding of the pri-
mary and secondary school level due to our federally organised state. In Switzerland, the 
member states (cantons) are the legislative bodies for the universities and therefore largely re-
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sponsible for their funding. The central state has merely a secondary allocation function, the 
so-called vertical financial equalisation. In addition to vertical financial equalisation, there is 
also a horizontal one, resulting from non-university cantons payments for their students to the 
university cantons. These payments are de facto political prices and do not reflect the real costs 
which students create during their study time. This situation is not at all satisfactory because 
the political prices are estimated to be too high or too low depending on the field of study. 
Based on this fact, the author was mandated by the central state and the University cantons to 
develop a standard cost accounting system, which should help to determine the ‘right’ prices. 
Standard-cost accounting is defined as a cost accounting system based on full costs and stan-
dard capacities.12 It is a widely used method in the business environment, but not in the uni-
versity sector. This is due to the fact that there is often no management accounting as such at 
the universities. Additionally, standard-cost accounting is conceived as being difficult to be 
defined due to the lack of an ideal production function as a benchmark for standardisation. 
This difficulty has to do with the different profiles and activities which universities want to 
achieve and might be one reason why there are no empirical data for standard-cost account-
ing at universities.   
With respect to the definition in the former paragraph, it is evident that standard-cost account-
ing, resulting from industrial production, cannot be directly implemented in the university sys-
tem. Despite the differences, there are two elements, which can be applied both in industry and 
universities: full-cost accounting based on actual costs and the so-called standard capacities. 
Whereas the actual costs (full costs) do not have to be discussed in detail, the second compo-
nent – the standard capacity – has to be analysed further. The question as to what standard ca-
pacity – no too great or too low capacity - means to a university can be answered by using a so-
called standard faculty-student ratio, whereas a high faculty-student ratio is related to a good 
interaction with the faculty staff and to outstanding education quality. Due to that, the faculty-
student ratio has been chosen as a pendant to standard capacity in the industrial production 
process. 
To determine a ratio suitable for standardisation, different ratios derived from literature were 
analysed, but nobody was satisfied with the results. In the end, it was agreed to enhance the 
simple ratio and to design a new model, which is better suited to reflect the workload of the 
system. The new model is based on supply and demand capacities and students and staff were 
asked to give their ideal norms to allow us the calculation of a benchmark for standardisation. 
For the time being, the data from the first run were evaluated and we are optimistic to find a 
valuable benchmark. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the seven European countries, which form the basis for the Rosalind Levačić study, different 
mechanisms to finance educational institutions are analysed. In practically all countries, formula-
based funding has asserted itself whereby the greatest part of resources is still allocated input-
oriented and not output-oriented. If the efficiency is analysed, it has been shown that formula 
based funding (coupled with a lump sum budget) does not automatically lead to significant gains 
in efficiency although this is a frequently used political argument in this connection. Also the 
question as to whether political governance by means of formula funding is possible cannot be 
answered without further ado in particular in those cases in which different political bodies are 
responsible for funding (central state and member states). 
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If it is assumed that not the funding mechanism but institutional factors are responsible for out-
standing education quality, the discussion about the advantage of formula funding methods com-
pared with traditional administrative methods loses its importance, at least in the western coun-
tries where schools are sufficiently equipped with staff and have an adequate infrastructure. 
But, although the introduction of formula based funding has – up to now – not led to major 
changes, this kind of funding is, despite everything, preferable to the traditional administrative 
discretion approach as it is based on targets or objectives to be achieved and not on ownership 
level guarantees. And last but not least: undisputable advantages of formula-based funding are, 
horizontal transparency and equity – as long as the formula takes the characteristics of a certain 
unit into consideration. 
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